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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by Christopher Furnari from an order 
of the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The 
petition challenged the United States Parole Commission's 
initial determination, affirmed by its National Appeals 
Board, consigning Furnari to offense Category Eight. 
Category Eight is the severest category under the parole 
regulations, and for Furnari the designation means a 
fifteen-year postponement of parole consideration. Furnari, 
who at various times was capo and consigliere in the 
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Lucchese crime family, was convicted in 1986 of extortion- 
based RICO violations and sentenced to a term of 100 
years. See United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 527-28 
(2d Cir. 1989) (appeal from conviction). At issue in the 
habeas petition is the Commission's determination that 
there was sufficient evidence to tie Furnari to a number of 
murders, which automatically led to the Category Eight 
designation. 
 
While Furnari's habeas petition was pending before the 
District Court, he supplemented it by filing a copy of an 
affidavit submitted by a government attorney to the United 
States District Court in Brooklyn, New York. The affiant 
declared that the individual on whom the government had 
principally relied to tie Furnari to the murders had lied in 
another case and was unreliable. During the same time 
frame, Furnari had a statutory interim hearing before the 
Commission, at which he presented the information in the 
affidavit, but the Commission denied his request for a de 
novo hearing. 
 
We take judicial notice of the Parole Commission's 
decision denying Furnari a de novo hearing. Our standard 
of review of the Parole Commission's determination is 
extremely deferential. Nevertheless, because the Appeals 
Board did not make clear in its decision on the interim 
hearing whether it continued to believe that the discredited 
witness was credible or otherwise concluded that there was 
sufficient information from other sources to tie Furnari to 
murder, we conclude that the Parole Commission abused 
its discretion by failing to follow its regulation requiring a 
statement of reasons for denying parole. We conclude that, 
under the governing statute and regulations, our case law 
requiring a statement of reasons is properly extended to the 
explanation of action at an interim hearing in 
circumstances where significant new information has been 
presented to the Commission. We will therefore vacate the 
order of the District Court and remand with instructions to 
grant Furnari's petition conditionally and order the Parole 
Commission to provide a new statement of reasons 
consistent with this decision. 
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I. 
 
Pursuant to the Parole Commission's Guidelines, 28 
C.F.R. S 2.20, Subchapter A, S 201, participation in a 
murder places a potential parolee in Severity of Offense 
Behavior Category Eight, which is the most serious offense 
level and requires the service of the longest prison term 
prior to parole consideration. At Furnari's initial Parole 
Hearing, the Parole Commission concluded that Furnari 
was a Category Eight, which means that he has to serve 
fifteen more years before his next de novo parole hearing.1 
 
The Parole Commission concluded that Furnari had 
participated in a murder based on information provided by 
Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District 
of New York David Kelley, who stated that three different 
people had provided information to the government about 
Furnari's involvement in several murders. They were 
Anthony "Gaspipe" Casso (a Lucchese family hitman), 
Thomas "Tommy Irish" Carew (a Lucchese family associate), 
and Alfonse D'Arco (a former acting Lucchese family boss). 
 
Before the hearing, Furnari wrote to the Parole 
Commission, urging it to reject any information provided by 
Casso because he had not been tested by cross 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA"), Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title 
II, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984), abolished parole, see  SRA S 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 
2027, 2031, but only for offenses committed after November 1, 1987, see 
Sentencing Reform Amendment Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-217, S 4, 99 
Stat. 1728. Furnari's offenses occurred prior to November 1, 1987. 
Section 235 of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 preserves the Parole 
Commission and the federal parole statutes for a period of time for 
transition to the new system. Section 235(b)(1) provides that 18 U.S.C. 
SS 4201-18, which created the Parole Commission and contain the parole 
law, "remains in effect for five years after the effective date [of the 
Act]." 
98 Stat. at 2027, 2032-33. The original five-year transition period would 
have expired on October 31, 1992. This section of the SRA has been 
amended twice. In 1990, the five-year transition period was extended to 
ten years, see Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title III, S 316, 104 Stat. 5115 
(1990), to November 1, 1997, see Sentencing Reform Amendments Act of 
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-217, S 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985). In 1996, the ten- 
year period was extended to fifteen years. See  Pub. L. No. 104-232, SS 1- 
3, 110 Stat. 3055 (1996). Accordingly, the transition period does not now 
expire until October 31, 2002. 
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examination in any criminal trial. In addition, Furnari 
requested that the Parole Commission not consider Kelley's 
letter unless certain FBI 302s (which concern the debriefing 
of witnesses) for Carew and D'Arco were provided. Furnari 
also wrote to Kelley asking for the 302 forms. Kelley 
declined to release the forms on the basis that Furnari had 
not cited any authority showing that he had a right to 
them. 
 
At the hearing, Furnari's counsel attacked Casso's 
credibility. He also argued that D'Arco's statement 
regarding Furnari's knowledge of murders carried out when 
he was consigliere was not credible, because D'Arco was in 
custody from 1983 through 1986 (when Furnari was 
consigliere) and would have known about Furnari's 
involvement only through hearsay. Furnari also claimed 
that there were no murders committed by the family while 
he was consigliere. 
 
Kelley responded by acknowledging that "most of the 
information does come from Casso" and by defending 
Casso, stating that he was and would continue to be viewed 
as a reliable government witness. Kelley also noted that 
Furnari had conceded that D'Arco was an expert on the 
hierarchy and structure of organized crime, and noted that 
D'Arco had stated that murders committed by Furnari's 
crew while Furnari was a capo would only have been done 
with his knowledge and consent. Kelley stated that there 
were a number of murders by the family both when Furnari 
was capo and when he was consigliere. 
 
The hearing examiner requested that Kelley submit 
further information regarding murders by the family, and 
afforded Furnari's counsel the opportunity to respond to 
information provided by Kelley. Kelley detailed fourteen 
murders committed by members of Furnari's crew during 
the time he was capo and consigliere. At least five of these 
occurred after he became consigliere. Kelley further 
represented that D'Arco and two other sources had stated 
that, immediately before he was convicted, Furnari met 
with other members of the Lucchese family hierarchy to 
select successors. According to these sources, the meeting 
participants decided that Anthony Luongo would pose a 
threat to the new administration and should be killed. 
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Casso and Vittorio Amuso were reportedly instructed to 
murder Luongo, and they did. 
 
Furnari argued that the Parole Commission could not 
consider any of the information because of the 
government's refusal to release the 302 forms and also 
because the reported testimony of Carew and D'Arco from 
other trials did not include statements implicating Furnari 
in these murders. He contended that the allegation 
regarding Luongo "had already been dealt with," seemingly 
referencing Furnari's own statement in a prior submission 
that Casso undertook to kill Luongo on his own. 
 
The hearing examiner rated Furnari a Category Eight. He 
recommended that Furnari be required to serve to afifteen- 
year reconsideration hearing in December 2011, finding 
that releasing Furnari on parole would depreciate the 
seriousness of the offense and promote disrespect for the 
criminal justice system. The National Appeals Board 
affirmed this decision. 
 
In 1998, Furnari, then an inmate of the Federal 
Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus in which he challenged the denial of 
parole. He asserted that he was denied due process 
because the Parole Commission, without a rational basis to 
do so, relied on information that he was involved in 
murders. The District Court found that, assuming that 
there is a liberty interest in parole, Furnari was not denied 
due process because there was a rational basis in the 
record before the Parole Commission to support its 
decision, and denied the petition. 
 
On appeal, Furnari supports his argument that Casso 
was unreliable by describing events that took place after 
the initial parole decision. In 1997, in an unrelated trial in 
the Eastern District of New York, the government, through 
an affidavit filed by Assistant United States Attorney George 
A. Stamboulidis, took the position that Casso was an 
unreliable witness and informed opposing counsel and the 
court that it did not intend to rely on him. The U.S. 
Attorney's Office then canceled Casso's cooperation 
agreement. Furnari argues that this information shows that 
the government knew all along that Casso was unreliable, 
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and that, at all events, it is now incontrovertible both that 
Casso is not credible and that there is no specific evidence 
to tie Furnari to any murder. 
 
While this habeas petition was pending before the 
District Court, Furnari received a two-year, interim review 
of the original action by the Parole Commission. This review 
is required by statute. See 18 U.S.C. 4208(h); 28 C.F.R. 
S 2.14. At that hearing, Furnari's counsel presented all of 
the new information demonstrating the government's 
doubts about Casso's reliability. The Parole Commission 
upheld the original denial of parole, and the Appeals Board 
affirmed that decision. The Appeals Board expressly denied 
Furnari's application for a de novo parole hearing to 
consider the newly discovered information, stating that "[i]n 
response to your claim that the decision was based on 
erroneous information, the evidence you have presented 
does not persuade the Commission that the information it 
has relied upon is inaccurate. Your request for a de novo 
hearing is denied." Days later, the District Court denied 
Furnari's petition. 
 
II.  
 
A. 
 
In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, this Court 
exercises plenary review of the district court's legal 
conclusions. See Jones v. Lilly, 37 F.3d 964, 967 (3d Cir. 
1994). However, a court's role in reviewing decisions by the 
Parole Commission on an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus is limited. The appropriate standard of review of the 
Commission's findings of fact "is not whether the 
[Commission's decision] is supported by the preponderance 
of the evidence, or even by substantial evidence; the inquiry 
is only whether there is a rational basis in the record for 
the [Commission's] conclusions embodied in its statement 
of reasons." Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir. 
1976); see also 28 C.F.R. S 2.18 ("The granting of parole to 
an eligible prisoner rests in the discretion of the United 
States Parole Commission."). This Court should review, 
however, whether the Commission "has followed criteria 
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appropriate, rational and consistent" with its enabling 
statutes so that its "decision is not arbitrary and 
capricious, nor based on impermissible considerations." 
Zannino, 531 F.2d at 690. To this end, "the Commission 
may not base its judgment as to parole on an inaccurate 
factual predicate." Campbell v. United States Parole 
Comm'n, 704 F.2d 106, 109 (3d Cir. 1983) (citations 
omitted). 
 
A parole hearing is not a trial-like adversarial proceeding. 
The prisoner may be represented at the initial hearing by a 
person of his choice, see 28 C.F.R. S 2.13(b), but parole 
hearings are informal, and the rules of evidence do not 
apply, see Campbell v. United States Parole Comm'n, 704 
F.2d 106, 109-10 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that hearsay 
evidence is admissible in a parole hearing). The United 
States Attorney does not bear any burden of proof in such 
proceeding, see 28 C.F.R. S 2.19(a)(4), (b)(1), and (d), but 
rather may provide relevant information to the Parole 
Commission for its use in making the parole decision. 
 
The Commission employs the preponderance of the 
evidence standard: "If the prisoner disputes the accuracy of 
the information presented, the Commission shall resolve 
such dispute by the preponderance of the evidence 
standard; that is, the Commission shall rely upon such 
information only to the extent that it represents the 
explanation of the facts that best accords with reason and 
probability." 28 C.F.R. S 2.19(c). Under the parole 
regulations, a parole applicant is vicariously liable for the 
criminal activities of associates under the following 
standard: 
 
       The prisoner is to be held accountable for his own 
       actions and actions done in concert with others; 
       however, the prisoner is not to be held accountable for 
       activities committed by associates over which the 
       prisoner has no control and could not have been 
       reasonably expected to foresee. However, if the prisoner 
       has been convicted of a conspiracy, he must be held 
       accountable for the criminal activities committed by his 
       co-conspirators, provided such activities were 
       committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and 
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       subsequent to the date the prisoner joined the 
       conspiracy. 
 
28 C.F.R. S 2.20, Chapt. 13, General Note 4. 
 
Furnari argues that the Parole Commission violated its 
own procedures and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment when it relied on the information provided by 
Kelley in making its initial determination that Furnari was 
responsible for murder. We do not reach Furnari's 
constitutional challenges to the initial parole determination, 
because we take judicial notice of Furnari's submission of 
Stamboulidis's affidavit to the Parole Commission at the 
interim hearing and the Commission's failure to provide 
Furnari a new statement of reasons despite the new 
information, and we conclude that the Commission failed to 
comport with 18 U.S.C. S 4206(b) and its regulations at the 
interim hearing. 
 
B. 
 
Under the applicable Justice Department regulations, an 
interim hearing is not a de novo determination of the 
prisoner's presumptive release date but a review of 
developments subsequent to the Commission's initial 
determination. See 28 C.F.R. S 2.14(a) ("The purpose of an 
interim hearing required by 18 U.S.C. S 4208(h) shall be to 
consider any significant developments or changes in the 
prisoner's status that may have occurred subsequent to the 
initial hearing."). 
 
The affidavit and the decision affirming the determination 
at the interim hearing are proper subjects for judicial 
notice. Federal Rule of Evidence 201 authorizes a court to 
take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact if that fact is "not 
subject to reasonable dispute." FED. R. EVID. 201(b); see 
also In re Indian Palms Associates, Ltd., 61 F.3d 197, 205 
(3d Cir. 1995) ("Judicial notice may be taken at any stage 
of the proceeding, including on appeal, as long as it is not 
unfair to a party to do so and does not undermine the trial 
court's factfinding authority.") (citations omitted). The 
government does not dispute that the affidavit was 
submitted to the Commission at the interim parole hearing, 
and we notice it not for the truth of the statements it 
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contains, but simply for the purpose of determining that 
new information regarding Casso's credibility was presented 
to the Parole Commission at the interim hearing. See Indian 
Palms, 61 F.3d at 205 ("[I]t is not seriously questioned that 
the filing of documents in the case record provides 
competent evidence of certain facts--that a specific 
document was filed, that a party took a certain position, 
that certain judicial findings, allegations, or admissions 
were made.") (citations omitted). Similarly, it is proper for 
this Court to take judicial notice of decisions of an 
administrative agency, and the decision of the Appeals 
Board affirming the Parole Commission's decision at interim 
hearing is such a decision. See Checkosky v. SEC , 139 F.3d 
221, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (taking judicial notice of 
administrative agency decision issued after the decision 
under review by the court); Opaka v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 94 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(taking judicial notice of immigration service's decision to 
suspend deportation to appellant-alien's wife). 
 
Stambouldis's affidavit undeniably represents significant 
information that, if the Parole Commission were to accept 
it, would be relevant to the question at the initial hearing 
whether the Commission correctly determined that Furnari 
was responsible for murder. The Appeals Board's decision 
affirming the initial determination that Furnari was a 
Category Eight credited Casso's information. The Board 
stated that 
 
       the Parole Commission finds the information from the 
       U.S. Attorney's Office on your personal responsibility 
       for several of the murders (victims Schliefer, 
       Taglianetti, and DeCicco) and attempted murder (victim 
       Abinanti) to be credible and reliable, even though much 
       of the information may have come from Anthony Casso, 
       one of the most violent members of your organization. 
 
This portion of the Statement of Reasons makes clear that 
the Commission relied in significant part on Casso's 
information in its initial determination that Furnari was a 
Category Eight. 
 
The Commission's decision following the interim hearing, 
however, does not mention the new information about 
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Casso's credibility presented at the interim hearing. The 
Appeals Board's affirmance of the decision from the interim 
hearing states that "the evidence you have presented does 
not persuade the Commission that the information it has 
relied upon is inaccurate." It is not possible to tell from this 
decision whether the Parole Commission continues to rely 
on Casso and find him credible, or has concluded that 
there is sufficient additional information tying Furnari to 
murder to conclude that he is a Category Eight even absent 
the information provided by Casso. 
 
The Commission is required, under 18 U.S.C. S 4206(b), 
to "state with particularity the reasons" for a denial of 
parole. See also 28 C.F.R. S 2.13(c) ("At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the examiner shall discuss the decision to be 
recommended by the examiner, and the reasons therefor, 
except in the extraordinary circumstance of a complex 
issue that requires further deliberation before a 
recommendation can be made.") (emphasis added). As we 
have stated, 
 
       We do not find it either overly intrusive or contrary to 
       the statute to require the Commission, which is under 
       a statutory mandate to "state with particularity the 
       reasons for [parole] denial," to truly provide reasons. 
       We believe that a statement of reasons must reveal 
       reasoning, and not simply present conclusions, at least 
       where that reasoning is not apparent from the facts of 
       the case. 
 
Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1988). 
In Marshall, it was not clear from the Commission's 
statement of reasons how the Parole Commission 
determined the amount of cocaine to attribute to the 
prisoner. See id. at 942. We noted that 
 
       Where reasoning beyond simple arithmetic or obvious 
       inferences is required to draw the conclusions upon 
       which the Commission relies, we see no reason why 
       the formal statement of reasons should not provide the 
       crucial missing logic. . . . In this case, a reasonably 
       intelligent person who was familiar with the relevant 
       facts of the case and who had read the Commission's 
       perfunctory explanation would still not have 
 
                                11 
  
       understood how the Commission reached its 
       conclusion. 
 
Id. 
 
This principle extends to the explanation of action at an 
interim hearing where significant new information is 
brought to the attention of the Parole Commission. 2 Section 
2.14, which provides for an interim hearing, requires that 
the interim hearing "shall be conducted by an examiner 
pursuant to the procedures of S 2.13(b), (c), (e), and (f) 
. . . ." See 28 C.F.R. S 2.14(a)(1). The provisions referenced 
include the requirement in S 2.13(c) that the examiner 
discuss "the decision" and "the reasons therefor." In a 
situation such as this, where the petitioner has presented 
significant new information to the Commission, the 
Commission's failure to consider it (or to provide a new 
statement of reasons for denying parole in light of the new 
information) is thus a violation of the statute and the 
regulations. The Commission is not an investigative agency. 
It reviews information furnished by other government 
agencies. Thus the Commission may reopen a parole 
decision for consideration of new information at any time 
prior to a prisoner's release, even if the new information 
was in existence, but was not considered, when the initial 
parole decision was made. See Bridge v. United States 
Parole Comm'n, 981 F.2d 97, 104 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation 
omitted). It is our view that, when new information is 
significant enough to seriously undermine the basis for the 
initial determination, the Parole Commission must provide 
a proper statement of reasons when it denies parole 
following an interim hearing. It cannot continue to rely on 
the statement of reasons from the initial determination, 
which no longer can suffice. 
 
As in Marshall, it is not possible to tell how the Appeals 
Board reached its conclusion following the interim hearing. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. 28 C.F.R. S 2.28(a) provides for the reopening of cases in light of 
"new 
information of substantial significance favorable to the prisoner." The 
government has not argued that S 2.28(a) is the exclusive method by 
which a prisoner can submit new information to the Parole Commission. 
Similarly, the government has not argued that the requirement of a 
statement of reasons does not apply at the interim hearing. 
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The government's own determination that Casso had lied to 
it about many matters calls into question whether the 
Parole Commission had a rational basis for its decision to 
the extent that decision was based on information from 
Casso. Yet the Appeals Board's statement of reasons 
affirming the decision at the interim hearing does not 
explain why the Board continues to categorize Furnari in 
Offense Category Eight. 
 
The government tries to deal with the insufficiency of the 
Parole Commission's statement of reasons by detailing all 
the information that did not come from Casso that was in 
front of the Parole Commission and tied Furnari to the 
murders. This information might well meet the standard of 
providing a rational basis on which to make the 
classification. But "the statute does not authorize the 
Commission to develop its reasoning in proceedings before 
the district court, let alone the court of appeals." Marshall, 
839 F.2d at 943. In reviewing an administrative agency's 
decision, we do not seek out some hypothetical rational 
support for the agency's action. "A court must review the 
agency's actual on-the-record reasoning process. Only a 
formal statement of reasons from the agency can provide 
this explanation, not a post hoc rationalization, or agency 
counsel's in-court reasoning." Id. at 943-44 (citing Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 50 (1983)). To the extent that we have, in prior 
cases, searched the record to find support for the Parole 
Commission's decision, we have done so only where"the 
Commission's conclusions were [ ] readily apparent" or "the 
challenged decisions were based on characterizations by 
the Commission." Marshall, 839 F.2d at 944. Neither is the 
case here. 
 
C. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 
statement given by the Appeals Board is an insufficient 
statement of reasons for classifying Furnari as a Category 
Eight. The Parole Commission thus abused its discretion at 
the interim hearing by failing to comply with 18 U.S.C. 
S 4206(b) and 28 C.F.R. SS 2.13 and 2.14, its own 
regulations requiring a statement of reasons for denying 
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parole. See Moret v. Karn, 746 F.2d 989, 992 (3d Cir. 1984) 
("An agency abuses its discretion if it fails to follow its own 
regulations and procedures."). Accordingly, the District 
Court's order denying the petition for habeas corpus will be 
vacated, and the case remanded to the District Court with 
the direction that it enter a conditional order granting the 
petition and directing the Parole Commission to provide a 
new statement of reasons consistent with this opinion, 
within a period of time that the District Court shall fix. 
While it may be more efficient for the Commission to simply 
afford Furnari a de novo hearing thereby obviating the 
necessity for other proceedings down the road, we leave 
that decision to the Commission. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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